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In recent years there has been a turn to the complexity sciences by evaluation scholars as way of 
producing richer theories of the social. However, and at the same time, what might be considered 
some of the more radical insights from the non-linear sciences are sometimes lost when they are 
represented within what I understand as a dominant paradigm; that evaluation is primarily a rational, 
detached activity based on design. This is particularly the case with evaluation scholars who adopt a 
contingency approach to complexity, and who argue that social interventions are not always 
complex, or may only be partly so. In critiquing the way that the complexity sciences are adduced I 
am making stronger claims for their significance, but also urging greater caution. Lack of precision in 
the way theories are taken up from the complexity sciences in evaluative terms may lead both to 
under- and over-claiming their import. In under-claiming scholars may put forward the idea, for 
example, that emergence is a special category of human activity and means the opposite of being 
planned. In over-claiming, they may argue that ‘complexity science’ supports any number of 
arguments which seem unrelated to any particular manifestation of the non-linear sciences. Insights 
may also get lost an appeal to abstract systems, mechanisms and ‘levels’ of reality. In this article I 
claim that human interaction is always complex, that emergence can be understood as the 
interweaving of intentions, and that evaluation is a social activity like any other, and is therefore not 
exempt from the evaluative process. Making claims for the replicability of ‘successful’ social 
interventions is a probabilistic undertaking if we accept one of the central insights from complex 
adaptive systems theory, that global patterns may tell us very little about the micro-processes that 
brought them about. 
 







During the last 10-15 years there have been repeated appeals to the complexity sciences to inform evaluative 
practice in the scholarly literature. This partly reflects the increased ambition of many social development and 
health programmes which are configured with multiple objectives and outcomes (Stern et al, 2011; Forss et al, 
2011, Connell et al, 1997) and the perceived inadequacy of linear approaches to evaluating them. It could also 
be understood as a further evolution of the methods vs. theories debate (Chen and Rossi, 1989; Weiss, 1995, 
1997, Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Stame, 2004) which has led to theory-based approaches becoming much more 
widely taken up in the evaluative practice. Although discussion over paradigms have clearly not gone away 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; Hedström, 2005) the turn to the complexity sciences as a resource domain for 
evaluative insight could be seen as another development in producing richer theories better to understand, 
and make judgements about, complex reality. However, some evaluators are understandably nervous about the 
challenge of what they perceive as being the more radical implications of assuming that non-linear interactions 
in social life may be the norm, rather than the exception.  
 
This article calls into question how far a turn to the complexity sciences in the evaluation literature marks a 
departure from more conventional understandings of the role and function of evaluators and to evaluation 
scholarship, and asks whether some of the more radical implications have simply been subsumed into the 
more orthodox ways of thinking by what Fleck (1979) referred to as the prevailing ‘thought collective’.  Fleck, 
an intellectual forebear of Thomas Kuhn (1996), described the ways in which groups of scholars, committed to 
understanding the world in a particular way, resist the rise of new ideas by either ignoring them or 
rearticulating them in terms of the prevailing orthodoxy. The article is principally theoretical and sets out to 
enquire into how the complexity sciences are understood by a variety of evaluation scholars, both in relation to 
the original scientific discipline from which the theories originate, and in terms of how they are then 
understood in social terms. Further, the article goes on to ask what difference appealing to the complexity 
sciences makes to the prescriptions that scholars recommend for evaluative practice. Lastly the article explores 
what might be considered some radical alternatives to evaluation and complexity scholarship to date, which, in 
my view is still rather attenuated, apart from a few exceptions. 
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My argument will focus on scholarship which makes a direct appeal to the complexity sciences, rather than 
using the term as, for example Stame (2004), Spicer and Smith (2008) and van der Knaap (2011) do, in an every 
day sense. These latter are no less insightful about the difficulty posed for evaluation as a discipline by complex 
social programmes. For example, in a helpful article taking a historical perspective on the evolution of the 
evaluation paradigm debate Stame argues that social development initiatives can be complex because they are 
stratified, with social actors embedded in their own contexts, and because each aspect that could be examined 
is multi-faceted (2004: 63). Stame thinks of complexity in terms of multi-layered governance with EC policy 
makers wanting to achieve certain outcomes in general, but being far removed from the contexts in the 
different European countries where the programmes are implemented. The difficulties that she identifies 
arising from the paradox of global intent and local implementation are to be found repeated in much of the 
literature that draws on the complexity sciences directly. Meanwhile, Van der Knaap writes interestingly about 
the importance of the evaluator paying attention to both the unexpected and the unwanted, in what he terms 
‘responsive’ performance audit and argues that from a variety of different perspectives evaluation orthodoxy is 
under pressure to be more participative, to be more thoughtful and to take more account of power and 
politics.  
 
Nonetheless, this article will discuss the extent to which the complexity sciences have come to disturb the 
discipline of evaluation, and will consider the ways that scholars think that they are, or are not helpful. 
 
Trends in the complexity and evaluation scholarship 
I will discuss three characteristics about the complexity and evaluation literature which have struck  me 
because they seem to be at the heart of the struggle over the complexity sciences and their import for 
evaluation. The first thing to notice is the number of scholars (Rogers, 2008, 2011; Patton, 2011; Forss and 
Schwartz, 2011; Funnel and Rogers, 2011; Marra, 2011; Ling, 2012; Stern et al., 2012) who suggest more or less 
strongly that the complexity sciences, however they are taken up, may be a perspective only applicable in 
particular circumstances and at particular times according to the evaluator’s assessment. Programmes which 
need evaluating, the authors claim, are either simple, complicated or complex, or complex programmes may 
have simple or complicated parts. It is considered to be a perspective, as Ling points out, that ‘can somehow be 
grafted onto more conventional approaches’ (2012: 84) dependent upon circumstances. In a domain which is 
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replete with a dizzying array of tools, techniques and perspectives all offered with propositional (if, then) logic, 
a complexity perspective is another weapon in the rational evaluator’s armoury. 
 
A second observation is the tendency to homogenise the various manifestations of different natural science 
complexity disciplines and to talk about them as though they could be understood as one theory with a 
common set of shared characteristics. Alternatively, the articles proceed as though the complexity sciences 
have one homogenised theory, but actually talk selectively about some characteristics of particular 
manifestations of the complexity sciences. While recognising the important move seriously to consider the 
implications for evaluation practice of non-equilibrium and non-linearity, this article will question whether it is 
enough just to call on ideas from the complexity sciences in general with the danger that important 
implications get lost in translation. There is also a danger of over-claiming what ‘complexity science’ does or 
does not support in our theorising about the world.  
 
And the third tendency, partly connected to the first and second points above, is a taken for granted 
functionalism, that assumes that social and/or health development interventions are helpfully construed as 
systems. Interaction is then understood as taking place between entities, agents, even institutions operating at 
different ‘levels’ of the system. The parallel between, say, complex adaptive systems theory, and the 
intervention understood as system, becomes a neat one and allows scholars to avoid explaining their theory of 
social action, or to interpret complexity theories from the perspective of social theory and thus to read into 
them more than they sustain. 
 
Simple, complicated and complex – choosing when to ‘apply’ complexity 
Scholars who have an interest in the complexity sciences have an understandable need to define what they are 
talking about both for themselves and their readers, and this has no doubt motivated them to draw on what 
has become known as the Stacey matrix (Stacey, 1992). Stacey’s matrix represents a contingency theory of 
organisations understood as complex adaptive systems and suggests that the nature of the decision facing 
managers depends on the situation facing them. In situations of great uncertainty and high disagreement, then 
conventional linear/rational methods of analysis and decision-making are inadequate, Stacey argues. Variations 
on Stacey’s idea of presenting complexity as contingent decision-making have been reproduced by others, 
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most notably Glouberman and Zimmerman (2002), who seem to have gained purchase amongst evaluation 
scholars such as Rogers (2008, 2011), Funnel and Rogers (2011) and Patton (2011), which has then led to 
others citing these ideas. 
 
Glouberman and Zimmerman’s proposal is that social problems are of three kinds: simple, complicated and 
complex. Simple problems require following a recipe, which, once mastered,  
carries with it a very high assurance of success in future. Complicated problems ‘contain subsets of simple 
problems but are not merely reducible to them. Their complicated nature is often related ….to the scale of a 
problem like sending a rocket to the moon’ (2002:1). Complex problems are ones like raising a child, where 
there is no formula to follow, and ‘success’ with one child does not guarantee success with the next.  
 
This is the kind of formulation which may look helpful on first reading but does not stand up to much careful 
investigation. Nor does it become more credible because it is widely taken up and endlessly repeated. It is hard 
to conceive of sending a rocket to the moon, except in the very narrow sense of being able to see whether one 
has landed on the moon or not, as being anything other than a complex undertaking. Inevitably on each 
occasion it will have involved widespread mutual adaptation and improvisation, disagreements, lacunae, the 
unexpected and the contingent, and with occasional catastrophic consequences (Apollo 13 and the Challenger 
disaster). Even following rules like a recipe, to draw on the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1999), is a 
highly social process where the rules inform practice and practice informs the rule. There is no recipe so clear 
that it is completely obvious what to do in every situation, and rules are ‘islands in the sea of our unformulated 
practical grasp of the world’ (1999: 34). 
 
If, as this article claims, the heuristic does not seem to support the weight of expectation freighted upon it, 
how might one account for its continued appeal? Although there seems to be some agreement that insights 
from the complexity sciences help us understand why social activity is unpredictable, to consider evaluation 
practice, which is also a social activity, in the same light radically decentres it: it can no longer be grounded in 
the certainties of the rational, designing evaluator. That is, if you accept Smith’s (1989) contention that 
without an explicit model laying out goals and measurable objectives a programme cannot be evaluated, then 
theories of change methods, all based on propositional logic models, immediately become problematic. Each 
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of the proponents of Glouberman and Zimmerman’s framework acknowledges this to a greater or lesser 
extent. Rogers (2008) argues that an evaluator needs to make their logic model more ‘flexible’, which appears 
to mean developing a series of logic models and being prepared to evaluate what she terms ‘emergent’ 
aspects of the programme. Patton (2011), meanwhile, is more or less radical, depending on whether the 
evaluation is deemed ‘developmental’ or not, according to the simple, complicated or complex heuristic. 
Similarly, Marra (2011: 331) concludes that while ‘complexity may potentially offer a valuable framework to 
understand complex systems, a complexity perspective cannot be applicable across all evaluation settings.’ In 
general then, Glouberman and Zimmerman’s schema allows evaluators in the mainstream to claim that the 
complexity sciences may be quite helpful but only in circumstances of their own choosing. They continue to 
cleave to what John Dewey (2005) referred to as a ‘spectator theory of knowledge’, which sustains a 
separation between the observer and the thing observed.  
 
There are scholars who take up the complexity sciences and do problematize the activity of evaluators more 
consistently than those who adopt the tripartite heuristic, such as Callaghan (2008) and Sanderson (2000, 
2009), whose work will be discussed more thoroughly below. 
 
One theory, several theories and over-claiming 
Whether it is helpful to enquire into the social with the support of theories derived from the natural sciences 
of complexity is contested. For example, and as Mowles et al. (2008) point out, in the domain of organisational 
theory, a number of scholars who are sympathetic to the idea of a complex social reality nonetheless 
problematise the instrumental application of complexity theory to social life (Chia, 1998; Tsoukas and Hatch, 
2001; Tsoukas, 2006). They reject the direct transfer of models from the natural sciences and explore how, if at 
all, complexity science ideas may be located in the context of established social theory relevant to 
organisations. Chia, for example, understands the application of complexity theory to social contexts as just 
another manifestation of scientific reductionism. 
 
If one is going to take up the complexity sciences in social settings, then, it is important to proceed with 
caution and to be as clear as possible how one is interpreting them. As pointed out above, some scholars 
develop a generic understanding of what they understand the complexity sciences to be saying, while others 
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draw on examples of particular theories. Just to take a sample of the sciences of complexity to which different 
authors refer, Sanderson (2000) and Callaghan (2008) allude to Prigogine’s (1977) dissipative structures, but 
without ever directly referring to him or what he took his work to mean. Meanwhile, Rogers (2008) and 
Westhorp (2012) refer to complex adaptive systems theory, as does Davies (2004, 2005) until he abandons it in 
favour of Social Network Theory as a means of drawing aggregate lessons from evaluations of large projects. 
From a contingency perspective discussed above, Patton (2011) draws extensively on a wide range of 
scholarship on the complexity sciences, tipping points, simple rules, CAS, without offering a view as to whether 
one particular branch of the complexity sciences is more helpful for understanding the discipline of evaluation 
than another.  
 
Does it really matter, or is it just a form of hair-splitting to argue that which theory and the way it is taken up, 
counts? Clearly it matters to some: Stern (2008) argues that the term complexity is ‘frequently and carelessly 
bandied about these days’. There is a need to understand the implications of the complexity sciences with 
greater precision. In the development of the disciplines of evaluation, particularly those claiming to be theory-
based, it is probably important to know what the theories being adduced actually claim to be revealing about 
nature, and to be able to make distinctions between one theory and another. To demonstrate what the 
difference is that makes a difference will take at least a brief explanation. 
 
In applying a heuristic, drawing on the work of Peter Allen (1998a, 1998b), to explain the way that different 
manifestations of the complexity sciences have evolved over time, Stacey (2011) demonstrates in step-wise 
fashion the different assumptions involved in a spectrum of mathematical or computer-based models of 
complexity. What we might term Step 0 represents an equilibrium model commonly found in classical physics 
and economics which assumes: a) a system with a boundary comprising interacting entities, b) that the entities 
themselves are homogenous, c) that the interactions between entities are assumed to be occurring at an 
average rate and d) that the system is assumed to move towards equilibrium.  
 
Step 1 following the development of complexity models in the natural sciences involves taking away 
assumption d), that the system is moving toward equilibrium, and substitutes non-linear for linear equations. 
The output of one equation simply feeds into the next iteration of the equation and is the basis for modeling 
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the movement of mathematical chaos, understood differently from the meaning of the word chaos in every 
day parlance, over time. For particular parameter values the model produces perfectly stable, predictable 
movement, known as a point attractor. At other values the model produces predictable patterns of peaks and 
troughs, known as a period two attractor. Meanwhile at different values again the model demonstrates 
explosively unstable behaviour. What Stacey identifies as important in models of mathematical chaos is that 
between parameter values which induce stability and high-dimensional chaos the system moves towards what 
is known as a strange attractor, which appears to be random but on closer inspection reveals itself to be a 
pattern which is both regular and irregular at the same time. These are not separate states, regular then 
irregular, but create a mutually constitutive, paradoxical movement over time of stable instability, or unstable 
stability. Models of mathematical chaos are very sensitive to small changes in initial conditions where a very 
difference in the data input can escalate to large scale change in patterning over time. This makes prediction 
as to how the model will evolve highly problematic. 
 
Step 2 of the evolution of complexity modelling involves dropping two assumptions from the classical 
paradigm, d) that the system is moving towards equilibrium and c) that interactions are occurring at an 
average rate. Stacey explains Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures using this step, which models 
convection patterns in laboratory experiments when heat is applied to certain liquids. At certain critical values 
the stability of the liquid breaks down and can spontaneously jump to a different state following non-average 
interaction with the environment, in this case with the application of heat. Unlike the model of mathematical 
chaos the process of change is not fully self-referencing, but is dependent upon absorbing energy from the 
environment, without which the change dissolves. But the liquid is also demonstrating a paradoxical ability to 
create new order from disorder and to self-organise at particular parameter values. 
 
Complex adaptive systems (CAS), agent-based models run on computers, have been developed to model 
evolutionary behaviour of diverse populations, or to reflect the way that, say, ants organize themselves in an 
ant colony, or even how the brain works. In other words, they are temporal models which change qualitatively 
over time and attempt to explain how order emerges from apparent disorder, without any overall blue-print or 
plan. They model dynamic behaviour. CAS can operate both at Step 2, as above, and at Step 3 of Allen’s 
heuristic, where, in Step 3 the three assumptions d) equilibrium, c) average rate interaction and b) 
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homogenous entities are all dropped. Both types of CAS models differ from mathematical chaos and 
dissipative structures because they are not macro models but attempt to describe how global patterns arise 
from local agent behaviour. The relation between the local and the global is a question, as we have noted 
before, which preoccupies evaluation scholars too (Stame, 2004; Davies, 2005). A Step 2 CAS, most famously 
Reynold’s ‘boids’ simulation (1987), models birds flocking. Homogenous boids, bit-strings of computer code, 
follow three simple instructions and by doing so mimic flocking patterns. These instructions are for each boid 
to match velocity with other boids in the vicinity, to head towards the densest part of the population of other 
boids in the vicinity, and to keep equi-distant from their neighbours. With these simple rules a self-organising  
global flocking pattern emerges as a consequence of boids acting locally.  
 
This latter example has been widely taken up in both organizational and evaluative literature with the 
recommendation that managers, project leaders, or evaluators should somehow just introduce simple rules to 
‘encourage emergence to happen’. However, and as Stacey points out, all the boids are the same and they are 
all following the same rules: as a consequence the pattern of emergence never evolves beyond flocking. It is 
important to consider how helpful such a proscription is for social life, where all human beings are unique, and 
even the simplest rules are open to misinterpretation. Stacey argues that it is only when the agents are 
diverse, their interactions are non-average and non-linear, a step 3 model, that what we might describe as 
truly evolutionary and novel behaviour emerges. In step 3 the model takes on a life of its own and produces 
patterns that the programmer could not have predicted.  
 
Ray’s (1992) simulation of hosts and predators is an early example of evolutionary step 3 CAS modelling, and 
the discipline has been taken up in Miller and Page’s (2007) work modeling complex social dynamics, 
Hedström’s analytical sociology (2005, 2008) and Allen’s models of evolving industries (Allen et al., 2006). What 
I am terming step 3 CAS comes closest to what Pawson and Tilley (1997), from the domain of evaluation, 
describe as generative causality. In other words, global patterns arise as a consequence of what each 
individual agent is doing with other similar agents acting locally, but the global pattern may give no insight into 
that local interaction. There are significant differences between Pawson and Tilley’s idea of generative 
causality and CAS, however, which I will explore below, but this is partly because, as Hedström expresses it: 
‘aggregate patterns say very little about the micro-level processes that brought them about’ (2005: 99). Just to 
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restate, emergence is taken to mean a global order which arises from, but is not reducible to, the sum of all 
local activity which in CAS terms is always governed by rules. 
 
It is evident from Stacey’s careful exploration of the different manifestations of the complexity sciences that 
each development of non-linear, non-equilibrium modelling undermines a more reductionist account of 
stability and change. However, each has its own characteristics and limitations, and can lead to different 
conclusions about how we might understand complex reality which is changing over time. Nor can we assume, 
as Stacey reminds us, that we can simply and unproblematically ‘apply’ these insights to the social as though 
agent-based models, mathematical models of weather patterns or chemical reactions, were the same as social 
activity. Models are helpful in supporting as to think about real world problems, but as CAS practitioners de 
Marchi and Page (2008) remind us ‘mathematical models uncover fundamental truths about mathematical 
objects and not much about the real world’. It is for this reason that Stacey is most interested in the insights of, 
in particular, step 3 CAS models and takes them up by analogy to explain the stable instability of social life. He 
develops his theory of complex responsive processes by drawing on similar insights from the social sciences, in 
particular the perspectives of the sociologist Norbert Elias (2000) and social behaviourist GH Mead (1934). He 
turns to CAS, because unlike mathematical chaos and dissipative structures, step 3 models are agent-based and 
temporal, modelling the changing and paradoxical relationship between the local and the global: local 
interaction between agents forms, and at the same time is formed by, global patterning and evolves 
qualitatively over time. 
 
There are numerous examples in the evaluation literature where scholars do not explain fully how they are 
linking their ideas to particular complexity sciences and argue too loosely for what the complexity sciences can 
or cannot support theoretically. It allows them either to over- or under-claim their significance for evaluative 
work. Alternatively, they interpret the complexity sciences to promote the default conception of evaluation as 
a rational, stable activity which can absorb identifiable pockets of complexity.  
 
As an example of the former, Marra, draws on ‘complexity science’ to make some quite grand statements about 
evaluative practice suggesting that it tells us ‘that all collections of individuals, including groups, inherently 
produce a hierarchical structure of roles.’ (2011: 326) or that it supports the need to be inclusive and sharing 
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(op. cit: 327) or that it supports the need for evaluators to distribute information and create ‘collective 
intelligence’ (op. cit: 330). Ling (2012) argues that drawing on complexity science, which he claims privileges 
the whole over the parts, helps reduce uncertainty, as does Spinatsch (2011), as at times in an extremely wide-
ranging and sometimes contradictory volume, does Patton (2011). It is difficult to trace how these scholars 
reached the conclusions they did from the sources they adduce. Meanwhile, as examples of under-claiming to 
fit a pre-existing set of certainties, those scholars already predisposed to a contingency approach to complexity 
(Rogers, 2008, 2011; Patton, 2011) suggest complexity is a ‘lens’ or a framework to be applied if helpful, and 
take emergence to mean the opposite of being tightly planned. Complex, dynamic and emergent interventions 
are a particular category of social programme, or even a part of social programme, which need a special and 
dynamic response, with evaluators trying to feed back data and information in real time (Ling, 2012; Marra, 
2011; Patton, 2011). In portraying emergence as a special phenomenon they have implicitly dismissed the idea 
that the human interaction is always complex, and that emergence, which we might understand in social terms 
as the interplay of intentions, is always happening, whether a social programme is tightly planned or not. 
 
On the other hand there are also scholars, such as Callaghan (2008), Sanderson (2009) and Westhorp (2012) 
who argue strongly for drawing on insights from the complexity sciences more generally to inform evaluation 
practice, rather than understanding the insights to refer only to special cases. Callaghan and Westhorp argue in 
favour of what they term ‘complexity-consistent’ approaches, while Sanderson argues that accepting 
disequilibrium as the norm rather than the exception implies greater modesty in social policy formulation as 
well as the practice of evaluation. I will investigate their work again below. 
 
Complexity and degrees of abstraction – the limitations of systemic theorising 
Evaluation scholars abstract to varying degrees from the social programmes they are invited to evaluate. 
Perhaps the highest degree of abstraction is demonstrated by those evaluators using experimental methods 
who are concerned to draw statistical distinctions between a ‘treatment group’ and a comparator group which 
is randomly selected. Experimentalists are generally disinterested in social theory and think of causality in 
terms of independent and dependent variables. Meanwhile, adherents of Theories of Change (ToCs) made 
popular by the Aspen Institute (1997), draw on propositional logic and represent social change in the form of 
entity-based logic models showing the linear development of social interventions towards their conclusions. 
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Additionally, however, they will often point to the importance of participation and involvement of the target 
population of programmes to inspire motivation (Funnel and Rogers, 2011). In this sense TOCs are a hybrid of 
functionalism and emancipatory social theory. 
 
Realist evaluators claim to be interested in ‘generative’ theories of causality, i.e. ones which open up the ‘black 
box’ of what people actually do to make social programmes ‘work’ or not.  Realistic evaluation draws on 
Bhaskar’s critical realism (1978) as taken up and developed by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Pawson (2006) and 
is the theory most often linked to the complexity sciences, particularly CAS. For example, Callaghan (2008), 
Marra (2011), Westhorp (2012), Barnes et al. (2003) all try to reconcile realistic evaluation and CAS. In doing so 
they adopt a functionalist, systems-based understanding as a default position and argue that interactions 
between human beings take place as ‘mechanisms’ and have an effect at different ‘levels’ of reality. Previously 
in this article we have made a conceptual link between step 3 CAS and realistic evaluation because they both 
have an understanding that stability and change does not arise because of ‘variables’, the staple of 
experimental methods, nor does it proceed with propositional logic as in ToC, but as a result of what agents are 
doing in their local interactions with other agents. Step 3 CAS are relational models demonstrating how 
patterns emerge over time because of ensembles of interacting agents. So from a realistic perspective and in 
the words of Pawson and Tilley: 
 
Realists do not conceive that programmes ‘work’, rather it is the action of stakeholders that makes 
them work, and the causal potential of an initiative takes the form of providing reasons and resources 
to enable programme participants to change. (1997: 215) 
 
Realistic evaluators argue that interventions do or do not achieve what they set out to because of a 
combination of context, mechanism and outcomes (CMO). It is concerned with finding what works for whom 
and in what circumstances and then extrapolating a detailed and evolving explanation to other contexts. In 
Pawson’s words it is predicated on the ‘steady accretion of explanation’ (2006: 176) about a reality which exists 
independent of the evaluators who are enquiring into it. Callaghan (2008) adds as further development on the 
idea of a mechanism, that what people are doing locally in their specific contexts to make social projects work 
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is to negotiate order, and Westhorp (2012) recommends trying to identify the local ‘rules’ according to which 
people are operating as a way of offering richer evaluative explanations of what is going on.  
 
It is easy to see the appeal of the link between a realistic evaluator’s interest in what people are doing to make 
a project work, through negotiated order or rule-following, and CAS. Realistic evaluation has much to 
recommend it in terms of its insistence on the importance of the particular history and local context of social 
interventions, and that prediction and questions of validity in different contexts are made highly problematic. 
However, some of the more arcane aspects of critical realism are in danger of covering over what we might 
think of as the radical implications of CAS. Rather than opening up the black box of causality realistic 
evaluators, in Norbert Elias’ words (1978: 73), seem to use a mystery to explain a mystery when they draw on 
the concepts of systems to describe the way that contexts and mechanisms work. For example, Pawson argues 
that social interventions are ‘complex systems thrust amid complex systems’ (2006: 168), and that: ‘A sequence 
of events or a pattern of behaviour are explained as being part of a system and the mechanism tells us what it 
is about that system that generates the uniformity’ (2006: 23). According to Westhorp: ‘Both complexity theory 
and a realist philosophy of science understands reality as comprising multiple, nested, open systems…’ (2012: 
406). For Barnes et al. (2003: 277): ‘In Health Action Zone terms we can see the ‘context’ as being made up of 
other system levels that interpenetrate…’. In my understanding of CAS models there is nothing to suggest that 
they are either open, nested, or have multiple levels. The global patterning that emerges may tell us very little 
about the local interaction that has brought it about: even if were able to identify local rules, or ‘generative 
mechanisms’, they would not necessarily help us, since there may be no obvious connection between local and 
global ‘uniformity’. Introducing functional abstractions, ‘system’, ‘levels’, ‘mechanisms’, covers over as much as 
it reveals about what may be happening in a social development intervention, and promises more than it can 
deliver if we are to take the insights from CAS seriously. Rather than being concerned with static, entity-based 
and spatial representations of complex reality where causal powers are attributed to machine-like 
mechanisms, CAS models are helpful in understanding qualitative changes in ensembles which change over 
time. 
 
Of course, realistic evaluators are not the only evaluation scholars to understand what they are doing in 
systemic terms, no matter how much the idea of a system is problematized: i.e. scholars often claim that 
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despite using the term, they do not think it is easy to know where the boundary of a system is, or claim that 
systems are open, or nested, or intersecting with other systems or whatever. It is only a short step to begin 
thinking that if the idea of a system in social terms is so problematic, then perhaps it would be preferable not 
to use it at all, but to find some other way of paying attention to, or describing what happens when social 
development interventions occur. Part of the explanation for the persistence of systemic abstractions may that 
they protect the discipline of evaluation by separating the evaluator from the object to be evaluated. In this 
sense, and despite the encouragement of a variety of evaluation scholars to value reflection, reflexivity and 
multiple views of reality (Marra, 2011; Patton, 2011; Barnes et al, 2003) this decentering radicalism rarely takes 
in the discipline of evaluation itself, with some exceptions (Sanderson, 2009; Callaghan, 2008). This is not to 
argue that evaluators, particularly in the realistic school of evaluation are unaware of the way that they 
influence social interventions, by learning then ‘teaching back’ as Pawson and Tilley (1997) express it. To a 
degree, then, evaluation scholarship takes refuge behind its abstractions and takes what the philosopher 
Thomas Nagel (1986) described as ‘a view from nowhere’, by which I understand him to mean that by 
abstracting away from ourselves as subjective thinkers we leave out precisely what we need to explain. Even 
those evaluation scholars, who problematize more positivistic perspectives on their discipline only go so far in 
developing how much these non-linear sciences apply to them and what they are doing in the practice of 
evaluation. 
 
Taking one more step in linking evaluation with insights from the complexity sciences 
In elaborating the perspective of complex responsive processes Stacey (2012, 2011), Stacey, Griffin and Shaw 
(2002) and Mowles (2011) draw on the complexity sciences to take a more radical position than any of the 
scholarship cited above, arguing for what we might term step 4. That is to say, Stacey and colleagues argue that 
the complexity sciences have important implications for the way that we think about social life, but that CAS 
models only take us so far. CAS models are, after all, merely computer-based simulations of living reality. They 
argue that in moving from computer modelling to theories of the social, but by preserving some of the insights 
by analogy, it might be helpful to think of social interaction as tending neither towards equilibrium nor as 
linear.  Social life always takes place local between diverse individuals who have their own history and multiple 
understandings of what is happening as they engage. Nor is this interaction most helpfully thought of as 
creating anything outside itself, such as a system with a boundary. Rather, global patterns of human relating 
 15 
arise from many, many local interactions, paradoxically informing and informed by what both Bourdieu (1990) 
and Norbert Elias (2000) referred to as the habitus. The habitus is habitual and repetitive, but because it is 
dynamically and paradoxically emerging it also plays out in surprising, novel and sometimes unwanted ways 
because of the interweaving of intentions. Social life demonstrates the same characteristics of irregular 
irregularity which most intrigued the complexity scientists. Instead of developing abstractions to describe the 
emergence of both individuals and society, Stacey and colleagues are interested in figurations of power 
relations expressed in the dynamics of inclusion, exclusion and identity formation, communication understood 
as conversation, and evaluative choices which reveal ideology. 
 
The implications of a radical view for evaluative practice 
What would be the implications for evaluative practice for maintaining this more radical interpretation of the 
complexity sciences, and assuming that non-equilibrium and non-linearity were the default rather than the 
exception? Firstly, I think it would make highly problematic the idea that evaluators can decide whether social 
interventions are complex or not, or that they can be partially complex, no matter how simple they appear to 
be, and no matter how routine people’s activities. Additionally, assuming a complex world would call into 
question the idea that emergence is a special category of social activity. Another way of understanding 
emergence is that social life is always emerging in one pattern or another, whether an intervention is tightly or 
loosely planned.  
 
Next, there would be no reason to exclude the process of evaluation itself from an understanding that social 
life is predictably unpredictable. Evaluation is a situated, contextual practice undertaken by particular people 
with specific life-histories interacting with specific others, who are equally socially formed. The evaluative 
relationship is an expression of power relations, both between the commissioner of the social 
intervention/evaluation and the evaluator, and between both of these and the people comprising the 
intervention, which will inform how the evaluation emerges. One way of understanding the growing insistence 
of some commissioners of social interventions on highly abstract ways of representing and evaluating them is 
that it enables them to ‘see like a state’ in James C Scott’s terms (1998), which I have explored elsewhere 
(Mowles, 2013). Scott argues that what he calls abstract and ‘thin simplifications’ cover over the very 
improvisational and adaptive activity that makes social projects work, and even improve them, and which 
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should be of interest both to commissioners and evaluators.  Only a purist experimentalist assumes that the 
methods they are using have no impact on the people they are studying, or at least they believe they can 
control for them, but an evaluator convinced about complexity might also take an interest in how their own 
practice forms, and is formed by the relationships they are caught up in with the people they are evaluating. To 
take up Callaghan’s invitation (2008), the evaluator would not just be interested in how people in the 
intervention negotiate order, but how the evaluation itself is negotiated. Equally, they would be interested in 
how power relations play out in, and affect, the social intervention. 
 
Evaluators would cease hunting for mechanisms, would be less interested in logic diagrams, no matter how 
‘flexible’, and would pay close attention to the quality of conversational life of social interventions, including 
how participants took up and understood any quantitative indicators that they might be using in the unfolding 
of the project. Evaluators might use narratives as a way of understanding how general intentions for social 
improvement play out in particular circumstances. Tsoukas (2009) argues that narrative is a good way of 
maintaining the paradoxical relationship between the particular and the general and a good example in the 
evaluative literature can be found in Greenhalgh et al.’s (2011) evaluative account of a large scale government 
IT project.  They would also be interested in how the programme changed over time and how people 
accounted for these changes: ‘progress’ in terms of the social intervention, could also be understood in the 
movement of people’s thinking and their sense of identity. Evaluators convinced of the importance of insights 
from the complexity sciences would argue, along with Sanderson (2009) that evaluators should assume a 
greater humility in their work and their claims about causality and replicability.  
 
Concluding remarks 
A wide variety of scholars have called orthodox evaluative practice into question and have argued for greater 
participation from beneficiaries, for greater thoughtfulness, responsiveness and humility on the part of 
commissioners and practitioners of evaluation, and for greater recognition of evaluation as a political activity, 
whether they mention the complexity sciences or not. In this article I have reviewed only those evaluation 
scholars who make a direct appeal to the complexity sciences in their work to offer a critique of what I consider 
to be some trends in the way they understand and take up the ideas.  
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I have argued that for the most part evaluation scholars try to accommodate insights from the complexity 
sciences in order to preserve the prevailing assumptions about the discipline of evaluation as a rational, stable 
activity somehow detached from the activities of the social intervention they seek to evaluate. I have argued, 
after Fleck (1979) that what I take to be some of the more radical insights then get subsumed within current 
orthodoxy. So, if the dominant view is that an evaluator takes a contingency approach to designing their 
evaluation, and that this is the prime task of the evaluator (Stern et al., 2012) then they must first decide 
whether the programme they are evaluating is complex or not, in whole or in part. If the social intervention is 
complex then particular techniques apply; if not, then not. Sometimes the best that a complexity perspective is 
thought to achieve is to make a propositional logic model more ‘flexible’.  Secondly, I have argued that 
sometimes scholars homogenise insights from the complexity sciences either to over-claim or to under-claim 
their importance. I have tried to point out how the complexity sciences have developed, and why that 
development makes a difference depending on which particular manifestation one chooses to engage with and 
interpret. It is important to deflate some claims, but challenge others: for example, the notion that emergent 
activity is somehow a special category of human relating and is the opposite of being tightly planned I would 
regard as a deflationary tendency in the evaluation scholarship. Thirdly I have tried to describe how what I take 
to be some of the more radical insights from the complexity sciences get lost in abstraction. For example, 
despite the claims of realistic evaluators to be interested in how and for whom social interventions ‘work’ and 
in generative causality, they still seem to committed to finding underlying ‘mechanisms’ and regularities, 
always located at a different ‘level’ of reality. 
 
As an alternative I have argued that if we were to assume that non-linearity in the social is the norm rather 
than the exception then this completely reframes the social activity of evaluation. In opening up the ‘black box’ 
of what people are doing to make social interventions work, we might become much more interested in 
fluctuating power relationships, including between the evaluator and the evaluated, in narrative accounts, and 
the paradoxical relationship between the general and the particular and how it is played out in many, many 
local interactions. We might accept that generalising from the ‘success’ or otherwise of particular social 
interventions will always be a probabilistic undertaking, and that there is no easy route to ‘scaling up’ or 
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